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Under the Kyoto protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change the
United States is charged with reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to seven percent below
their 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. These reductions could be met from many industries
including agriculture. In this paper, an economic simulation model is linked to an ecosystem
model to quantify the economic efficiency of policies that might be used to sequester carbon (C)
in agricultural soils in the Northern Plains region. Simulations with the Century ecosystem model
show that long-term soil C levels associated with a crop/fallow system are less than those for
grass alone, but that soil C levels for grass-clover-pasture are greater than for continuously
cropped grains. The analysis shows that a CRP-style policy is found to be an inefficient means to
increase soil C because the per acre payments to convert crop-land to grass-only draw land from
both the crop/fallow system and the continuous cropping system, and costs typically exceed
$100 per MT (metric ton) of C. In contrast, payments to adopt continuous cropping were found to
produce increases in soil C for between $5 to $70 depending on area and degree of targeting of
the payments. The most efficient, lowest cost policy is achieved when payments are targeted to
land that was previously in a crop/fallow rotation. In this range, soil C sequestration appears to be
competitive with C sequestered from other sources.Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 
in the Northern Plains
Under the Kyoto protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change the United States is charged with reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to seven
percent below their 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. These reductions could be met from
many industries including agriculture. Changes in agricultural land use and management
practices can sequester (store) carbon (C) in agricultural soils and could reduce U.S. emissions by
up to eight percent (Lal et al. 1998). However, little if any research to date has assessed how
much it would cost to sequester C, except for the case of converting crop-land to trees (McCarl
and Schneider 1999; Stavins 1999; Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller 1999). Other potential means
of sequestering C within the agricultural sector are changes in land use, such as conversion of
crop-land to permanent grass, and management practices such as the use of no-till and reduced
fallow. In the extensive semi-arid area of the Great Plains, these practices are likely to be
economically feasible where afforestation—the conversion of non-forest land to forest—is not.
Agriculture in the semi-arid regions of the Great Plains also tends to be economically marginal
compared to regions such as the Midwest. If agriculture in these locations can produce soil C at a
cost that is competitive with other means of sequestering C, farmers in these areas could benefit
economically from national and international efforts to reduce atmospheric C.
A precedent exists for using compensation schemes to enhance the environmental
benefits from use of agricultural land. Agricultural policies, such as the conservation reserve
program (CRP), provide producers with per-acre payments in return for changes in land use and
management that provide environmental benefits. However, economists have recognized that
per-acre payments are not economically efficient because they fail to account for the site specific
nature of the resulting environmental benefits and costs (Feather, Hellerstein, and Hanson 1998;
Antle and Mooney 1999). Carbon sequestration differs from other environmental services such as
wildlife habitat or recreation in that the value of a ton of C sequestered at all sites has the same Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 2 
marginal social value (say, $V per metric ton) in terms of reducing the risk of climate change.
However, the costs associated with changes in land use and management practices, and the
potential for each area to sequester C, vary across sites. An economically efficient policy would
pay farmers $V for each metric ton of carbon sequestered on each land unit. Because of
difficulties in measuring soil C levels on a site-specific basis, policies are likely to be designed to
pay farmers for undertaking observable changes in land use or management practices on a per
acre basis. The more closely these policies target incentives to actions that are more efficient at
increasing soil C, the better they will approximate an efficient soil C sequestration policy. 
In this paper we link an economic simulation model to the Century ecosystem model to
quantify the economic efficiency of alternative policies that might be used to sequester C in
agricultural soils in the Northern Plains region. The economic simulation model represents
changes in land use and management decisions on a site-specific basis in response to economic
incentives provided through a soil C policy (or through a market for carbon emissions
reductions). The Century ecosystem model is used to simulate the equilibrium levels of soil C
associated with the principal dryland grain production systems in the region, including winter
wheat and spring wheat in both crop/fallow rotations and continuously cropped, and for
continuous grass (CRP land). Model outputs are combined to assess the costs of inducing
changes in equilibrium levels of soil C through three types of policies. The first is a CRP-style
policy that provides producers with per acre payments for converting crop-land to permanent
grass; the second is a policy that provides payments to farmers who use continuous cropping,
regardless of the land’s cropping history; the third is a policy that provides payments only to
those areas that are converted from a crop/fallow rotation. 
Agricultural Production, Soil C Sequestration, and Policy Design
Agricultural soil C sequestration can be enhanced through changes in land use (e.g.,
conversion of crop-land to grass) or changes in production practices (e.g., use of conservation Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 3 
1Tiessen, Stewart and Betany (1982); Mann (1986); and Rasmussen and Parton (1994), estimate that 20
percent to 50 percent of soil carbon is lost from the soil during the initial 20 to 50 years of cultivation. 
tillage, or reductions in fallow) (see Rasmussen and Parton 1994; Tiessen, Stewart, and Betany
1982; Mann 1986; Lal et al. 1998). The effectiveness of these changes in sequestering C depends
on both cropping intensity and tillage practices. Franzluebbers and Arshad (1996) suggest that
soil C will increase slowly over the first 2-5 years of improvements with larger increases between
5-10 years, flattening off thereafter and reaching a finite limit after about 50 years (Lal et al.
1998).
Estimates show that 49 percent of agricultural C sequestration can be achieved by
adopting conservation tillage and residue management, 25 percent by changing cropping
practices, 13 percent by land restoration efforts, 7 percent through land use change and 6 percent
by better water management (Lal et al. 1998). A single land use or management practice will not
be effective at sequestering C in all regions. Once a producer reverts to conventional
management, stored C is released.
1 
Command and control, incentive based or market based policy designs could be used to
encourage producers to increase soil C (see Antle and Mooney 1999). Under a command-and-
control policy farmers would be mandated to use prescribed land use or management practices
that result in increased soil C. This is generally an inefficient approach to achieving
environmental goals unless each producer is identical, as regulators have a limited ability to tailor
mandated technologies to each producer (Council of Economic Advisers, 1990). Incentive based
policies, such as the CRP and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, offer inducements
such as subsidies to encourage farmers to engage in desired activities (Osborn 1997; Lynch and
Smith 1994). Disincentives, such as a tax, can be used to discourage producers from engaging in
an activity. This policy design also is likely to be inefficient for achieving environmental goals as
it is based on payments for changes in management rather than achieving the environmental goal.  Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 4 
A third class of policy instrument is market-based trading. A trading scheme for sulfur
dioxide emissions has been in place in the United States since 1990 (Petsonk, Dudek and
Goffman 1998; Joskow, Schmalensee and Bailey 1998) and the agricultural sector is already
participating in emerging markets for other environmental goods such as water and water rights
(Landry 1996; Colby, Crandall, and Bush 1993). Market-based trading can result in an efficient
outcome if the market price reflects the social value of the environmental attribute. Some initial
research on carbon trading in agriculture is found in Antle and Mooney (1999) and Sandor and
Skees (1999).
Simulation Framework for Analysis of Soil Carbon Sequestration
This section describes the empirical methods used to analyze C sequestration policies in
the Northern Plains. The simulation framework consists of two disciplinary models, a field-scale
economic model and a biophysical process model. These models are used to simulate changes in
land use patterns, input use, and soil carbon under alternative policy scenarios.
Economic Model of Crop Choice and Management Decisions
The field-scale economic model was developed to simulate land use and management
decisions in the dryland grain production system of Montana that is typical of the Northern Plains
region (Antle et al. 1998; Antle and Capalbo 2000). Econometric production models are used to
estimate crop supply and variable cost functions for winter wheat, spring wheat and barley
produced with or without fallowing the land in the previous year. These models were estimated
using data from a sample of 425 farms that are statistically representative of the USDA’s Major
Land Resource Areas (MLRA) in the grain-producing regions of Montana (Figure 1). MLRAs
are designed to represent major soil and climatic regions in the United States. These zones were
stratified into sub-MLRAs based on whether the area receives high or low precipitation
according to historical climate data. Data for the economic model are described in Johnson et al. Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 5 
(1997) and the parameter estimates for the supply and cost equations are discussed in Antle et al.
(1998) and Antle and Capalbo (2000).
A stochastic simulation model of land use allocations and net returns was constructed
using the econometric production models and the spatially explicit economic data (Figure 2).
This stochastic simulation model is interpreted as generating a statistical representation of the
population of production units (fields) in a spatial region as it is based on the stochastic
properties of the econometric models and the sample data. The model simulates field scale
producer crop choices (winter wheat, spring wheat, barley, or fallow), and the related output and
cost of production conditional on that crop choice over several growing seasons. By operating at
the field scale, the simulation model can represent spatial differences in crop rotations and
productivity that give rise to different economic outcomes in the region. These differences in
land use and management are critical for analyzing soil C changes in the Great Plains in response
to alternative economic policies.
Each field in the data set is described by its size in acres, location, and an associated set
of location-specific prices paid to and received by the farmer (Figure 2). Tillage practices, use of
crop insurance, and previous crop initialize the model. These are based on draws from sample
distributions estimated from the data. The economic models for each crop are simulated to
estimate expected output and cost of production, and to calculate expected returns above short
run variable costs of production for each crop alternative. 
Biophysical Process Model
Soil carbon estimates are made using Century, a comprehensive biogeochemistry model
(Parton et al. 1994). Soils and climate data for each of the sub-MLRAs are used as model inputs
in addition to management variables such as crop type and rotation, fertilization and tillage
practices. The Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model (PRISM) data set
was used to determine weather-related data. Information on current management systems is from
the field-scale survey of Montana producers, augmented with the USDA National Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 6 
Statistics Service (NASS) database, the National Resources Inventory (NRI) database, and
county-level databases of the National Association of Conservation Districts (NACD). Soil
characteristics are determined using the Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR)
database (USGS-Earth Resources Observation System (EROS) Data Center), the State Soil
Geographic Database (STATSGO) and the NRI database. Baseline projections of soil C are made
using historical climate and land use records. These projections are compared to NASS records
of county-level crop yields and changes in soil C derived from the Century database of native and
cultivated soils. The initial land use allocation from the Montana survey was used to calculate
base C levels for each sub-MLRA. The initial distribution of C in Montana range from 20 to
nearly 36 MT per hectare (8 and 14.5 MT per acre) for different production systems and regions.
Additional details and references to the data sets are in Paustian, Elliot and Hahn (1999). 
Simulation of Land Use, Crop Choice, and Soil Carbon Levels
The economic simulation model selects the land use that maximizes expected returns for
each sample field for each policy scenario that is investigated. The economic simulation is
executed over a time horizon sufficient to reach an equilibrium for each policy setting %j (e.g.,
each payment level for conversion of crop-land to grass). The land use patterns are then
summarized for each sub-MLRA in the form of proportions si(%j ) of land allocated to the ith use.
The Century model is used to simulate the equilibrium levels of soil carbon for each production
system in each sub-MLRA. Letting the level of soil C for each land use be Ci, the
level of soil C associated with land use i and policy setting j is then the weighted average
(1) C(%j) =  i  si(%j)Ci .
Empirical Results
We now present the empirical results from analysis of three policies: a CRP-style policy
for conversion of crop-land to permanent grass; a policy that pays all farmers on a per-acre basis
for land in continuous cropping; and a policy that targets payments for continuous cropping only Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 7 
to acres that were previously in a crop/fallow rotation. Before presenting these results, we shall
make two observations about these production systems that help explain the outcomes. 
First, the field-level survey data collected for the 1995 crop year, as well as data collected
by the Montana Agricultural Statistics Service at the county level, show that under the present
policy regime, farmers in Montana allocate roughly one-third of crop-land to the crop/fallow
system, one-third to continuous cropping (or to what is referred to as a re-cropping system in
which farmers include an occasional fallow into the system), with the residual one-third of the
land in fallow. The econometric analysis shows that, in a given year, the crop/fallow system
provides higher yields and lower average variable costs of production, and thus higher returns per
acre on average relative to the continuous cropping system. However, these higher returns must
be traded off against the opportunity cost of a forgone season of returns while the field is
fallowed. As a result the two cropping systems compete closely in terms of net returns over the
long-run (Antle et al. 1999). Second, simulations of these systems with the Century model show
that (i) the levels of soil C under a crop/fallow rotation are about 3-6 MT per hectare (1.2 - 2.4
MT per acre) less than continuous grass, (ii) that soil C levels under grass are 3-6 MT per hectare
(1.2 - 2.4 MT per acre) less than under continuous cropping and (iii) that the levels of soil C
under a grass-clover-pasture mix are about 7-10 MT per hectare more than continuous cropping
(Figure 3).
Payments per acre for Conversion of Crop-land to Permanent Grass (CRP-Style Policy)
The economic simulation model was executed for each field in the data set using
observed initial conditions (previous crops and prices). Prices were set at values for each location
that are representative of long-run averages over the past decade. The land use alternatives were
winter wheat, spring wheat or barley (either continuously cropped or fallowed). In addition, the
farmer could choose to enter a field into continuous grass (grass, clover, pasture) and receive a
payment. In the simulations this payment ranged from zero (the base case) to $75 per acre by $15
increments. Current CRP contracts are in the range of $30 to $40 per acre in Montana. Figure 4 Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 8 
shows the resulting supply curve for land in grass. The largest proportion of land allocated to
grass occurs in the sub-MLRAs where crop returns are lowest, and vice-versa (sub-MLRAs 52
High and 52 Low are the most productive areas). The simulation correctly predicts that about 20
percent of crop-land is allocated to CRP when the payments are in the $30 to $40 per acre range.
As payments increase, the share of land placed into grass increases sharply for the less productive
lands.
Figure 5 shows the effects of this payment scheme on equilibrium levels of soil C by
sub-MLRA, for the conversion from crops to grass-clover-pasture. The CRP-style payment has a
large impact on net soil C levels in those sub-MLRAs that have the steepest supply curve for
grass (Figure 4). As shown in Figure 3, the crop/fallow system yields a lower level of soil C than
the continuous system, and grass yields a higher level of soil C. When the changes in soil C due
to the change in cropping patterns are translated into costs per MT C, the results show that the
costs are high, ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars per metric ton. At these levels, soil
C from crop-land conversion would not be competitive with other sources such as tree planting
or industrial sources (Sandor and Skees 1999; Stavins 1999; Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller
1999).
Payments for Continuous Cropping
We now consider a policy to pay farmers for continuous cropping. Clearly, only land that
is switched from crop/fallow to continuous cropping produces an increase in soil C. However, if
the policy pays only farmers who switch from crop/fallow to continuous cropping, and not also
farmers who already use continuous cropping, the policy creates an incentive for farmers who are
currently in continuous cropping to temporarily change to crop/fallow and then back to
continuous cropping. Also, farmers in continuous cropping might object to being excluded from
the program, on equity grounds. Therefore, in the following analysis we consider two cases: all
acres continuously cropped are eligible for payments, regardless of their previous cropping Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 9 
history (nontargeted); and only acres with a history of crop/fallow are eligible for continuous
cropping payments (targeted).
Recall that current land allocation (with the CRP in operation) is about evenly divided
between the crop/fallow system and continuous cropping, because the two systems yield similar
economic returns. This means that a relatively small payment per acre is sufficient to induce
farmers to switch land from crop/fallow to continuous cropping. Figure 6 shows that in the base
scenario ($0 payments) without any CRP-type payments, approximately 20 percent of the land is
in continuous cropping. Payments of $5 per acre increase the percentage continuously cropped to
the range of 50 to 65 percent (ignoring sub-MLRA 54a and b). A payment of $10 per acre
increases the percentage to 75 to 85 percent; a payment of $15 per acre further increases the
percentage to over 90.
Figure 7 shows that these changes in the percentage of land continuously cropped yields
increases in equilibrium soil C levels by 2 to 4 MT per acre with a $5 per acre payment. The
higher payments ($10 to $15) result in proportionally smaller increments. These soil C levels
translate into costs per MT of C ranging from $5 to $70, depending on area and whether the
payments are targeted (Figures 8 and 9).
Figure 10 shows the marginal cost curve for carbon sequestered for two sub-MLRAs,
52-h and 53-l, for the targeted and nontargeted scenarios. When the changes in soil C are
translated into costs per MT, and it is assumed that all continuously cropped acres are eligible for
payments regardless of cropping history (which is the nontargeted case), the costs range from $20
to $40 per MT C with the $5 per acre payment, and increase to almost $60 per MT C in
sub-MLRA 53-l and to about $40 per MT in MLRA 52-h with $15 per acre payments. When the
payments are targeted to acres that were previously in a crop/fallow rotation, the costs per MT C
decline by about $10 per MT with a $5 per acre payment in both sub-MLRA 52-h and
sub-MLRA 53-l. This difference narrows as the payments increase to $15 per acre. Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 10 
These results indicate that conversion from crop/fallow to continuous cropping could be
competitive with other agricultural and non-agricultural methods of sequestering soil C under a
continuous cropping payment scheme. A recent study on afforestation in Maine, South Carolina,
and Wisconsin indicates that the average cost estimates are in the range of $45-$60 per MT C
(Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller 1999). A study by Stavins (1999) estimates that the average cost
per MT C sequestered through afforestation to be in the range of $38 per MT for the Delta states
to approximately $70 per MT for the United States as a whole. Sandor and Skees (1999) indicate
that early market signals from potential carbon trades are predicting market values between $20
and $30 per MT C. 
Finally, we can calculate the total carbon sequested in the sub-MLRAs for each payment
scheme. At a per acre payment of $2.50, .54 million MT of carbon are sequested. This rises to
4.9 million MT when payments increase to $7.50 per acre and to 10.5 million MT at the highest
per acre payments ($15.00) considered in this research.
Conclusions
Simulations with the Century ecosystem model show that long-term soil C levels
associated with a crop/fallow system are less than those for both continuously cropped systems
and grass-clover-pasture systems, and soil C levels for grass-clover-pasture are generally greater
than for continuously cropped grains. These simulations are combined with results of an
economic simulation model that show how land use and management changes respond to policy
incentives. The analysis shows that a CRP-style policy is found to be an inefficient means to
increase soil C, with cost per MT C ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars. In contrast,
payments to adopt continuous cropping were found to produce increases in soil C at a cost of $5
to $70 per MT C. The most efficient policy is achieved when payments are targeted to land that
was previously in a crop/fallow rotation. Whether or not the policy is targeted, soil C Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 11 
sequestration from changes in cropping practices appears to be competitive with C sequestered
from other sources such as forestry or the energy industry. Economics of Agricultural Soil Carbon Sequestration 12 
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SPR  =  Spring planting decision FAL =  Fallow
WW =  Winter wheat SW =  Spring wheat










SW-F W-F G4crp SW W GCPcrp











10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95




























52_h 52_l 53a_h 53a_l 54_h 54_l 58a_h 58a_l









0 15 30 45 60 75 90











0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15






































52_h 52_l 53a_h 53a_l 54_h 54_l 58a_h 58a_l
Figure 6. Share of Crop Land in Continuous Crops with Payments per Acre for
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Figure 7. Soil C Levels with Per Acre Payments for Conversion from Crop/Fallow
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Figure 8. Costs per MT C for Non-Targeted Payments for Conversion from Crop/Fallow
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Figure 10. Marginal Cost Curves for Soil under Non-Targeted and Targeted Payments for
Two Sub-MLRAs in Montana